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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 747



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

## FRENCH TRADE WITH AFRICA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 25 Sep 81 pp 2424-2425

[Report: "Trade Between France and Developing Countries in 1980; France and Non-French Speaking Africa"]

[Text] Overall trade between France and non-French speaking Africa accounts for about 4 percent of the overall worldwide French trade.

The French balance of trade with this group of countries, which showed a surplus in 1978, is currently showing a deficit which totaled 3 billion francs in 1980. The balance of trade had already turned negative in 1979 (-1.3 billion), which means that this deficit rose substantially in 1980. The main reason for this increase was Nigeria, with which France showed a negative trade balance of 7 billion francs in 1980.

France and Non-French Speaking Africa  
(in billion French francs)

	1979	1980
1 Importations françaises totales .....	457.1	570.8
2 Importations en provenance d'Afrique non francophone .....	15.8	24
3 Exportations françaises totales .....	414.7	489.7
4 Exportations vers l'Afrique non francophone .....	14.5	21
5 Balance commerciale .....	- 1.3	- 3

- Key: 1. Total French imports  
2. Imports from non-French speaking Africa  
3. Total French exports  
4. Exports to non-French speaking Africa  
5. Trade balance

Following the same procedure used for French-speaking African countries, we have classified these countries by big geographic area.

North Africa. The results of this zone may be seen in Table No 1. French trade with this zone showed an extensive surplus as a result of a very favorable balance of trade with Egypt. French purchases from this group of countries were essentially crude oil from Libya, cotton from Egypt and petroleum products (light fractions and fuel oil), small quantities of which were bought. All in all, crude oil purchases accounted for 65 percent of all purchases from this zone and came essentially from Libya.

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Table 1. Trade Between France and North Africa  
(in million French francs)

	1 Imports		2 Exports	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Ceuta Melilla, Canaries 3	37.7	23.9	308.1	298.1
Libye 4	2 855.5	2 878.2	2 904	2 841.2
Egypte 5	275.7	545.3	3 687.6	5 450.2
Soudan 6	188.5	217.8	428.7	387.9
Total 7	3 157.4	3 683.4	7 328.4	8 977.4
dont : pétrole (1) 8	2 495.6	2 363.2	-	-

(1) Tonnage : 3.9 millions de tonnes en 1978, autant en 1979, et 2 millions de tonnes en 1980. 9

Key: 1. Imports; 2. exports; 3. Ceuta Melilla, Canary Islands; 4. Libya; 5. Egypt; 6. Sudan; 7. Total; 8. Of which petroleum (1); 9. (1) tonnage: 3.9 million tons in 1978, as much in 1979 and 2 million tons in 1980.

French sales are quite diversified. In Libya's case, however, they consisted essentially of automotive vehicles (33 percent of French sales to that country) and heavy equipment. Let us emphasize that the balance of trade with that country is virtually balanced (slightly negative).

To Egypt, with which French trade shows a substantial surplus, France sells a substantial quantity of cereal crops and malt (30 percent of total value of sales). The balance consists essentially of industrial equipment, automotive vehicles and aerial navigation equipment. Everything seems to indicate that such sales would continue to increase on the basis of the latest industrial agreement concluded between the two countries on 16 July 1981, making France Egypt's biggest industrial partner. Let us point out that sugar accounts for one third of French sales to the Sudan.

West Africa (Table No 2). The French balance of trade with this zone is largely negative because of the dominant position of Nigeria, which is the third largest supplier of petroleum to France, totaling 10.9 million tons of crude oil. The French balance of trade with that African country is -6.4 billion francs. A negative balance of trade prevails with Liberia also, to which French sales dropped by nearly 40 percent in 1980 compared with 1979.

Table 2. Trade Between France and West Africa  
(in million French francs)

	Imports 1		Exports 2	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Gambie 3	29.9	28.8	39.1	51.5
Guinée-Bissau 4	2.3	18.9	23.2	38.5
Sierra-Léone 5	15.8	19.4	80.2	95.8
Liberia 6	458.7	528.2	535.8	330.9
Ghana 7	65.7	96.7	77.4	111.2
Nigeria 8	6 382.3	12 729.5	3 245	5 715.5
Total 9	6 954.7	13 421.5	4 000.7	6 343.4
dont : pétrole (1) 10	6 144.6	12 200.1	-	-

(1) En tonnage : 8.5 millions de tonnes en 1978, 10 millions de tonnes en 1979 et 10.9 millions en 1980. 11

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Key: 1. Imports; 2. Exports; 3. Gambia; 4. Guinea-Bissau; 5. Sierra Leone; 6. Liberia; 7. Ghana; 8. Nigeria; 9. Total; 10. of which petroleum (1); 11. (1) in tonnage: 8.5 million in 1978, 10 million in 1979 and 10.9 million in 1980.

Other than petroleum, French purchases from this zone have consisted mainly of cocoa beans from Ghana and iron ore from Liberia, which is the fourth biggest supplier of France with 2.3 million tons in 1980 as against 1.8 million in 1979, or 12.5 percent of French purchases of this kind.

Here again French sales are quite diversified. Let us note, however, that sales of automotive vehicles to Nigeria rose from 1.48 billion francs in 1979 to 2.33 billion francs in 1980, or by 63 percent in one year. French exports of ships (tankers, fishing, etc.) to Liberia remain substantial, although showing a drop compared with 1979 (-35 percent), a trend which began in 1977. Here again, French sugar exports kept their relatively substantial position.

Central Africa (Table No 3). French exports to Angola, the only substantial partner, are continuing to develop. Such exports, which are quite diversified, have consisted essentially of equipment and automotive vehicles (and wheat flour, among comestible products). French imports from this country have remained unchanged.

Table 3. French-Central African Trade  
(in million French francs)

	Importation 1		Exportations 2	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Guinée équatoriale 3	2.5	1.5	3.1	11.6
São Tome Principe 4	—	12.8	9.2	8.6
Angola 5	16.9	5.7	203.2	387.9
Total 6	19.4	20	215.5	408.1

Key: 1. Imports; 2. Exports; 3. Equatorial Guinea; 4. Sao Tome and Principe; 5. Angola; 6. Total

East Africa (Table No 4). Overall, the French balance of trade with Eastern African countries remains negative. However, French exports rose from 731.5 million francs in 1979 to 1,109,400,000 francs in 1980, or by 52 percent. French exports to Zambia, Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia showed substantial progress.

Table 4. Trade Between France and East Africa  
(in million French francs)

	Importations 1		Exportations 2	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Éthiopie 3	116.6	161.6	113	95.3
Somalie 4	16.1	5.7	31.2	116.7
Kenya 5	135	149.7	263	349.2
Ouganda 6	291.2	270.7	11.5	83.4
Tanzanie 7	66.3	50.1	80.7	121.3
Mozambique 8	52.8	44.6	137.7	214.4
Zambie 9	916.4	955.5	46.2	109.1
Malawi 10	30.8	36.1	46.2	20
Total 11	1 627.2	1 674	731.5	1 109.4

Key: 1. Imports; 2. Exports; 3. Ethiopia; 4. Somalia; 5. Kenya; 6. Uganda; 7. Tanzania; 8. Mozambique; 9. Zambia; 10. Malawi; 11. Total

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French imports from this zone have changed little in terms of value (+3 percent only), hence a lowering of the negative French balance of trade with these countries. French purchases from Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique cover essentially farm products. Zambia, however, is France's main supplier of unrefined copper cathodes, accounting for 43 percent of overall French supplies.

France's exports to these countries remain diversified. Somalia increased quite substantially its purchases of automotive vehicles (from 9.9 million francs in 1979 to 63.9 million francs in 1980); the same applies to the rest of the countries in this zone.

West Africa (Table No 5). Except for the Republic of South Africa, trade between France and West Africa is insignificant. Let us emphasize the resumption of French trade with Zimbabwe, with which the balance of trade is negative. Most French imports consist of item No 77 (cast iron, steel). About 50 percent of French exports to that country consist of refined petroleum products.

Table 5. Trade Between France and West Africa  
(in million French francs)

	Importations 1		Exportations 2	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Botswana 3	-	-	-	-
Swaziland 4	0.7	0.9	3.8	3.3
Lesotho 5	12.4	15.2	1.3	0.7
Zimbabwe 6	3.02	2.6	1.4	0.3
Rép. sud-africaine 7	-	154.6	0.4	75.7
Total 8	4 043.6	5 087.1	2 247.4	4 071.1
	4 059.7	5 260.4	2 253.9	4 151.1

Key: 1. Imports; 2. Exports; 3. Botswana; 4. Swaziland; 5. Lesotho; 6. Zimbabwe; 7. Republic of South Africa; 8. Total

France's balance of trade with the Republic of South Africa, which was quite negative in 1978 and 1979, became slightly better balanced in 1980, while still remaining quite negative (-1,016,000,000 francs in 1980 and -1,796,200,000 francs in 1979). In 1980, French exports to the Republic of South Africa account for 6 percent of France's total exports to Africa. Imports from that country accounted for 10.2 percent of French imports from Africa.

In 1980, as in 1979, most French imports from the Republic of South Africa were item No 27 goods, totaling 1,926,900,000 francs (+47 percent). This consisted of South African coal purchased by France. These imports are broken down as follows: anthracite, 59<sup>c</sup>,226 tons, or 24 percent of total French imports (the Republic of South Africa is the third largest supplier, after the USSR and the FRG); lean coal, 1,322,355 tons or 85 percent of French procurements (main supplier); coking coal, 671,890 tons; other coal, 6,643,162 tons, or 39 percent of French supplies, main supplier. The total is 9,236,000 tons of coal as against 8,117,300 tons in 1979, or a 14 percent increase.

The second most important item is French imports of inorganic chemicals, totaling 1,291,400,000 francs, most of which is natural and enriched uranium: 21 percent of the total tonnage imported by France, which makes the Republic of South Africa the second biggest supplier to France after Niger (4,145 tons in 1980 as against 3,858



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tons in 1979, or +7.5 percent); 170 tons of natural uranium were imported from South Africa in 1980 as compared with 137,000 in 1979 (or a 24 percent increase).

Imports by France of some minerals from South Africa are not negligible in the least compared with total French procurements. This applies to manganese, chromium and titanium, broken down as follows:

Manganese, 485,300 tons of ore, or 40 percent of French purchases, second largest supplier;

Chromium, 87,200 tons, main supplier, 31 percent of French purchases;

Titanium, 18,900 tons, main supplier, 77 percent of French purchases.

All in all, imports of such items declined compared with 1979.

Finally, the last important element of French imports from South Africa is that of precious metals and diamonds. In 1980, France purchased 2,718 kg of gold as against 530 kg in 1979; 513.8 kg of platinum and platinum alloys, as against 232.4 kg in 1979; and 56,356 karats of unpolished diamonds, or 8 percent of French purchases.

Most French sales (2,037,000,000 francs) were of item No 84 (boilers, machines and mechanical engines), which were part of equipment items, and item No 85 (electrical machines and apparatus) (436.7 million francs). These two items account for 61 percent of French sales to South Africa. Sales of French vehicles to that country accounted for 8 percent of total sales (344 million francs).

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF DIEGO GARCIA EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1082, 30 Sep 81 p 13

[Article by Denis Ropa: "What is the strategic importance of Diego Garcia?" Question asked by Armand Tissot, Lille, France]

[Text] Situated in the Chagos archipelago, half way between the Indian subcontinent and Madagascar, the small coral island of Diego Garcia (25 square kms) bears the name of the Portuguese seafarer who discovered it in 1532. Now it is the largest American base in the Indian ocean. Linked until 1965 with Maurice Island, then a British colony, the latter, after its independence, ceded it back to the London government which then rented it for 50 years to the United States with a view to "joint utilization for defense purposes." (J.A. No 1019).

The Mauritian prime minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, "unaware" of the content of the successive agreements of 1967 and 1976 between the two great powers, is demanding the return of Diego Garcia which has not been used as agreed upon by Maurice and Great Britain (i.e., merely as a communications station). Following his proposal, a resolution plan favoring restitution was adopted unanimously by the participants in the 17th Summit of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] at Freetown (Sierra Leone) in June 1980.

The attitude of the Mauritian head of government, who was, however, one of the negotiators of the cession of Diego Garcia, is less surprising when one knows that the next elections could put in power the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), Marxist in tendency, lead by Paul Berenger and Jean-Paul de l'Estrac, who advocate making the Indian ocean a "peace zone," and who are therefore hostile to an American military presence.

The Malagasy president also, Didier Ratsiraka, for whom "bases are the exact opposite of peace," proposes the scheduling of a conference on the subject in Madagascar in 1982. "One cannot," he said, "convert the Indian ocean into a peace zone and at the same time build new bases there which, like Diego Garcia, cost millions of dollars. These bases must be dismantled; they happen to be American, but I would demand the same thing if they were Soviet...."

Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam does not go so far. Quite simply, he would like to renegotiate the Diego Garcia statute directly with the United States without the

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mediation of Great Britain, which still regards itself as the owner of the island. As regards the American presence, he considers it ultimately justified since Moscow is doing all it can to "destabilize the Indian ocean."

The invasion of Afghanistan, the progress of the Red Army towards the warm seas along the route which supplies Japan and the Western world with oil...these are so many pretexts for the Americans to reinforce their positions on Diego Garcia. Sheltered from cyclones, and far from any possible surveillance point, the island, cleared of its 1,200 inhabitants in 1971, could not lend itself better to the circumspet equipping of a naval base.

For 10 years, the Sea Bees, American marine corps units, have worked in shifts without letup to transform a small paradise into "a veritable natural aircraft carrier." There is a 3,600 meter runway capable of receiving large transporters of the C130 type, deep water harbor installations, eight gigantic fuel reservoirs, a major telecommunications station, basins for long range missile submarines (ULMS), and more than 30 kms of roads. A total of \$200 million. A fresh works program (estimated at \$237.7 million) will permit the anchoring of the aircraft carriers Midway and Kitty Hawk, and the improvement of the airfield's landing strips.

Such work programs provide good reason for worry for the coastal countries of the Indian ocean; they fear the outbreak of hostilities on this oil route and that they will be the ones to pay for the confrontation, as was the case for the Pacific islands during the Second World War. Will anyone heed their voices, although discordant, and their hope of one day seeing the Indian ocean transformed into a "peace zone"? It is doubtful.

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BENIN

STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION WITH FRANCE TAKEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 25 Sep 81 p 2442

[Report: "President Kerekou in Paris"]

[Text] Colonel Mathieu Kerekou, president of the Republic of Benin, was paying a visit to France this week. As we pointed out, the visit seems to represent the final stage of normalizing relations between Benin and France.

President Kerekou arrived in Paris on 23 September. The same day he had lunch at the Elysee Palace with President Mitterrand. The president of Benin was accompanied in his visit to Paris by several ministers and senior officials such as Pierre Osho and Mrs. Nathalie Barboza, deputy chairperson of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly; ministers Paul Ifede Ogouma (foreign affairs and cooperation), Baba-Moussa Aboubacar (plan), Colonel Isidore Amoussou (finance), Gado Girigissou (public works and housing), Major Martin Dohou Asonhiho (information and propaganda), Major Edouard Zodehougan (technical and vocational education); Valere Houeto, secretary general of the government, and Mede MoussaYaya, Benin's ambassador to Paris.

During his stay in Paris President Kerekou met with J.-P. Cot, minister of cooperation and development, and Robert Badinter, minister of justice. He received Georges Marchais, secretary general of the communist party, Chirac, the mayor of Paris, and a delegation from the CNPF [National Council of French Employers].

Benin and France

On the occasion of President Kerekou's visit to France, let us recall that his advent to power in 1972 marked a turn in relations between France and Benin. At that time, Major Kerekou blamed "foreign domination," meaning France, of being "the prime reason for the country's backwardness. The attempted overthrow of his regime by some 100 European and black mercenaries, who landed by plane in Cotonou on 16 January 1977, provided another occasion for accusing France, which triggered the recall of the French ambassador.

The Marxist-Leninist orientation and the nationalization of key economic sectors intensified the "misunderstanding" between the two countries even further. However, starting with 1978, relations began to improve slowly, leading eventually to a visit by Robert Galley, the then minister of cooperation, to Cotonou in 1979. The improvement was concretized by increased French aid which, in fact, had never been

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suspended, and which rose from 61 million French francs in 1975 to 95 million in 1980. The president's trip, therefore, marks the completion of the normalization process.

On the economic level, let us recall that Benin (115,000 square kilometers, 3.4 million population) has an economy based essentially on food growing. However, the country is still not fully self-sufficient despite a substantial improvement in output because of strong demographic expansion.

Thanks to the port of Cotonou, which is being steadily developed, and which handled 1.5 million tons of freight in 1980, Benin is a natural outlet for import and export activities of neighboring countries without access to the sea, notably Niger. Actually, the port will be expanded with a view to relieving the pressure on the port of Lagos in Niger.

Finally, off-shore petroleum deposits (10 million tons) will also be exploited as of next year. This will largely reduce the cost of petroleum purchases, which exceeded 10 billion CFA francs in 1980, and thus eliminate the trade deficit.

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BOTSWANA

PLANNED RAIL LINK WITH WALVIS BAY REPORTED

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 p 28

[Text] As the world's energy crisis worsens, Isaac Mando reports on the emergence of a plan to link land-bound Botswana with the Atlantic coast at Walvis Bay, a move that would help entrench South Africa in Namibia.

The possibility of a railroad linking land-locked Botswana to the Atlantic port of Walvis Bay in Namibia has emerged following a recent statement by Botswana's Minister of Finance, Peter Mmusi.

The idea of a railway linking the central part of Southern Africa to the west coast was first mooted more than 50 years ago. It is now gathering momentum as the world energy crisis worsens and the search for alternative fuel sources becomes more urgent.

Feasibility studies have reflected more optimism recently in the light of Botswana's coal wealth, particularly in the south-east Morupule fields.

Export Potential

Botswana's coal export potential could encourage the opening of a line from Palapye to Gobabis, a railhead on the existing line to Walvis Bay.

But politics remains the major stumbling block. The government is not actively pushing for the trans-Kalahari line because of the continuing war in Namibia. Informed sources say the scheme would probably be opposed by other Frontline states until Namibia's independence is settled. The South African Government claims Walvis Bay as part of the Republic.

Namibia's private sector has for years shown great enthusiasm for the idea, predicting tremendous benefits for Southern Africa.

Des Matthews, owner of a Namibia mining company who has pursued the plan for 26 years, is trying to give it fresh impetus.

Matthews, managing director of Trust and Mining Co (Pty), is due soon to lead a delegation of overseas business interests for talks with authorities in Gaborone.

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He said the business men he planned to take to Botswana would probably try first to secure coal purchasing contracts. The provision of capital for the project might follow.

A Johannesburg girm, Loxton Hunting, has calculated that a railway line from the Botswana border to Gobabis--and improvements to the existing Gobabis-Walvis Bay link--would cost nearly \$300 million and take five years to build.

It would create hundreds of jobs. A new ore terminal at Walvis Bay costing about \$90 million would also reduce the port's dependence on the ailing fishing industry.

The improvements to Namibia's track, bringing the envisaged link to a total length of 1,400 km, would entail the flattening and straightening of the Gobabis-Walvis Bay connection to accommodate long and cumbersome coal trains.

"Studies on the railroad have long since reached the stage of determining the various gradients," said Matthews. "The plans are well there, the scheme is completed. Interested parties could virtually go out to tender now," he said.

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

NO AGRARIAN REFORM WITHOUT CONSENSUS--Cape Verdian President Aristides Pereira confirmed that the incidents that took place in the island of Santo Antao on the occasion of the discussion of a bill for agrarian reform in the country had resulted in the death of a person opposing the project, who had attempted to disarm a member of the police force. President Pereira affirmed that the agrarian reform bill now under discussion, aimed at making the exploitation of the land more equitable and at updating agriculture, will not be presented to the National Assembly if it does not obtain a popular consensus. He specified that the text of the bill guarantees that land belonging to Cape Verdians who have emigrated abroad will not be expropriated. [Excerpt]  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2498]  
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GAMBIA

SANYANG: LEADER OF A REVOLUTION THAT WENT SOUR

London WEST AFRICA in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 18, 19

[Text]

Although the attempted coup in The Gambia was quickly suppressed, there is evidence that initially it attracted surprisingly strong support from many sections of society. *Ndey Aja Faal* reports on the failed revolution and the man behind it

FOLLOWING a civilian-led "military" attempt to overthrow the government in July, The Gambia is still in a state of emergency. The death toll from the attempted coup and the aftermath is estimated at close to 1,000. Families in the capital Banjul and the suburbs are being given emergency food aid. Doctors, nurses and medicine have been flown in. Saudi Arabia and other countries have already donated more than £10 million. President Dawda Jawara has signed the 29-point Emergency Powers Regulations. He awaits repatriation of Kukoi Samba Sanyang from Guinea-Bissau where the leader of the attempted coup was arrested along with nine others late last month.

The *Gambia Gazette* has so far published the names of 665 persons of the 700 reported arrested and detained in connection with the rebellion. The most important of these is detainee No. 137 Sherrif Mustapha Dibba, leader of the National Convention Party (NCP) opposition in Parliament. Leaders of the banned Socialist Party Pengu George and Koro Sallah of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) have been reported killed during the unrest.

The regulations under which they were held authorise "the police or any troops temporarily stationed in The Gambia to detain any persons suspected of having participated in, or aided and abetted in, a

rebellion". Chieel Jawara, the President's wife, said on her release as a hostage that she had been interrogated at the residence of the Opposition leader during her captivity. If this is true, it will damage the rebels' image and their cause. Their professed Marxist proletarianism could be interpreted as hot air. For the NCP and Jawara's PPP manifestos are identical.

A Review Tribunal has been constituted. Whether it will be mandated to conduct trials, or simply to screen detainees before trial, remains to be seen. It consists of a solicitor or barrister appointed by the Chief Justice, and five presidential appointees. The power of signature of death warrants now lies with the Inspector General of Police.

This mandate followed the announcement to the foreign Press by the Attorney General that the ringleaders of the coup will be charged with treason. Execution will probably be by firing squad. The Gambia's stretch of beaches already bring ghastly memories of April 1980 in Liberia.

### Not well known

Contrary to reports from news agencies, Kukoi Samba Sanyang was not in the military. Neither was he a well-known opposition politician. A product of St. Augustine's High School in Banjul, he

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masterminded the takeover with friends inside the Field Force. A former classmate described him as the last person you'd think would lead a coup.

"But it would not be all that surprising. Kukoi belongs to the rising urban young men and women whose exposure to world events, has developed in them a lower threshold for corruption and bad government," he said. "They cannot stand what their parents took for granted."

Samba Sanyang, indeed, charged the Jawara Government with corruption, and with running low-calibre health, education and welfare services. The government, Sanyang announced in his takeover speech on Radio Gambia, had strangled the economy. But the plot thickened when he aligned himself with socialist ideals vested in revolution and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

A Gambian student in London said: "I lost hope in Sanyang very quickly. His methods became irresponsible. One must align oneself with dynamic forces, not with former business moguls turned socialist after their businesses collapsed. Change, yes. I agree. But you do not arm prisoners and children and set them loose against the community. Nor do you scream socialism and dictatorship from thin air. It must be understood that to a certain extent Jawara was a nice little well-behaved boy to most of the world, and in African circles. Total condemnation of him would be difficult as we have all seen.

### Hard to interfere

"All Sanyang had to do was keep it at the level of an internal crisis. No Libya. No Marxism. No socialism. No reinforcements from Guinea-Bissau. Make it basically a people screaming for change at home. Senegal would have found it hard to interfere in that kind of backyard squabble. If they did, world opinion would have been harsher."

Foreign missions in Banjul came to the government's aid during the crisis. The Communist Chinese made available their communications equipment to keep President Jawara in touch with London

and Dakar via Peking. The Nigeria High Commission offered sanctuary to a government minister. The British High Commission was instrumental in communicating British assurances of support and, probably, for contacts with the SAS. The Senegalese office became the President's bunker.

The civil service received the news of the coup with suppressed jubilation. The number of civil servants among the detainees speaks of the support for the coup. This quickly spread with radio endorsements of the rebellion by certain influential village and religious heads. High on the list is Alhaji Sanjally Bojang, one of the architects of the political movement which became the PPP, and who invited Jawara to lead the party in the 1950s. Bojang was chief of Kembujeh outside Brikama, Jawara's electoral seat. He has been stripped of this chieftaincy and detained.

### 'What remains is how quickly the detainees will come to trial'

More than 30 Gambians and another 100-odd sympathisers turned out last month in London to denounce the presence of Senegalese troops in Banjul. The Senegalese Embassy staff failed to show up to receive the petition. The demonstrators carried banners and chanted anti-Senegal slogans under the watchful eye of London's Metropolitan Police.

"The march was not in support of the coup," a leading organiser told *New African*, "but a serious attempt to show our discontent with Senegal's military presence in The Gambia. We understand our particulars have been sent to Banjul as agitators. But we reserve the citizen's rights to demonstrate."

### Restless nights

Senegal's President Abdou Diouf told the French daily *Le Matin* of his restless nights over the decision to send his troops to Banjul. His main worry was the reaction from Paris. He took the decision without consultation. Diouf has since had

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talks with the French Government over the proposed SeneGambia merger the two West African Presidents had embarked on since the coup attempt.

Foreign travellers from The Gambia bring repeated reports of severe torture of Gambian detainees. Similar stories have come from Gambians who fled across the border with Senegal. The publication of lists of detainees and the setting up of the Review Tribunal are steps in the right direction, but observers are waiting to see how the trials are conducted and how quickly detainees are brought before the Tribunal●

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

IMF ASSISTANCE--The International Monetary Fund authorized Guinea-Bissau on 17 September to purchase 1,850,000 SDR within the framework of compensatory financing to compensate for the drop in export receipts for the 12 months ending in March 1981. The main reason for this drop was the 45-percent decrease in peanut exports as a result of the drought and the drop in the price of this product on the international market. Guinea-Bissau's quota at the IMF amounts to 5.9 million SDR, and its obligations to the Fund now total 1.1 million SDR. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2498] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

IMF ASSISTANCE--The International Monetary Fund authorized Ivory Coast on 17 September to purchase 114 million SDR (or approximately \$125 million) as compensatory financing in anticipation of a drop in export receipts in 1981. More than three-fourths of this drop would be related to coffee and cocoa exports, since their prices have decreased on the international market. Ivory Coast's quota at the IMF is 114 million SDR, and its obligations at this time amount to 116.8 million SDR. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2500]

FAVORABLE EXIMBANK CREDIT--The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) has granted Ivory Coast a credit amounting to \$99.35 million at the interest rate of 10 percent, reimbursable in 20 years (instead of the normal 10 years). According to Eximbank's own communique, the bank is thus waiving international regulations in order to "counter intense French competition." The credit granted Ivory Coast is earmarked for the purchase of \$136.2 million worth of electrical equipment in the United States (turbines, generators, etc.) for the hydroelectric complex at the Naoua Falls, on the Sassandra River. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1973, 2 Oct 81 p 2500] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

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MALI

FIVE-YEAR PLAN STRESSES NATIONAL PRODUCTION STYLE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French No 1872, 25 Sep 81 pp 2439

[Report: "The Draft 1981-1985 Plan; The Total Cost Will Be 936 Billion Mali Francs"]

[Text] At its 17 September extraordinary session, the Malian National Assembly examined the five-year plan for the country's economic and social development for the 1981-1985 period.

The five-year plan, which was submitted by Ahmed Mohamed Hamani, minister of planning and transportation, and was amended at the meeting of the Higher Council for the Plan, held in Bamako last July, includes 539 projects requiring a total financing of 936 billion Mali francs.

They include 114 projects related to the rural economy, to which 282.7 billion Mali francs, or 30.1 percent of total financing have been allocated; 140 projects, costing 251.7 billion (26.9 percent) will be related to infrastructures, communications and housing; and 77.7 billion will go to the social sector (8.3 percent).

The plan meets the major guidelines formulated by the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM), the only constitutional party, which is trying to develop an "independent planned national economy." The new plan, which calls upon the population "to take its own future in hand," is characterized by the desire to improve the national production system on the basis of primary rural collectives.

The reorganization of the state sector is another priority included in the draft plan, which also intends to consolidate enterprises considered "strategic" and whose support is deemed essential to the national economy. Finally, the plan stipulates that "Certain state and mixed enterprises will be consolidated as well."

Bid Tender Based on the European Development Fund (No 1689) for Rice-Cultivation Sections. On the basis of anticipated EEC financing, the Malian government has called for bids on additional controlled flooded rice-cultivation sections in the Segou region. The project is divided into two lots: 1. Development of Farako; 2. Development of Tamani. This includes the terracing of approximately 730,000 cubic meters for lot 1 and 740,000 cubic meters for lot 2, plus various other works.

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Bids must be sent before 27 November 1981 and addressed to The Director General of Rural Engineering, BP 155, Bamako. The file (150,000 Mali francs) can be obtained from the same source or consulted on the premises of the information services of European Communities, 61 Rue des Belles-Feuilles, Paris 16e.

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SEYCHELLES

CHOICE OF CREOLE AS NATIONAL LANGUAGE REPORTED

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 p 23

[Text] Creole is now the national language of Seychelles, bringing to an end a long and bitter controversy over which language should take pride of place in the country's affairs – Creole, French or English. Primary schools will start teaching Creole from January. Most school subjects will be taught in that language. English will be the only other teaching medium. This report comes from Victoria

CREOLE, the mother tongue of the Seychelles, will now be used as the medium of instruction in the island's schools.

This is the result of a keenly argued and comprehensive debate organised by the ruling party – Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) – at its third annual national congress.

English gets second place while French, which has been spoken for many years by Seychellois, is now relegated to third place.

President Albert René, who chaired SPPF's central executive committee which decided the language question, said: "In a revolutionary society it is important that the processes of analysis and re-analysis, of criticism and self-criticism, continue every minute of our lives."

This was an invitation to discuss the language issue thoroughly.

The committee consisted of members of the national congress, Minister of Education and Information James Michel, officials of the Department of Education, and head teachers of all the schools in Seychelles.

**A mistake**

President René stressed that the historic decision made by the congress meant that the official bilingualism of English and French with equal status was over. Bilingualism would now mean that the islands would have only one other foreign language.

Referring to an earlier decision by the congress to aim at establishing both English and French as the equal official languages at the cost of Creole had been a mistake, President René said. Even if a decision was reached by consensus, it was not necessarily correct.

"Very often, whether in our personal or political lives," he explained, "we are called upon to change a decision because experience and time have proved that we have made a mistake." Hence, the change in the country's first language, he said.

The committee took one day to complete the task and make recommendations. This included answering a set of nine questions put to it by President René on behalf of the central executive committee. These mainly covered such issues as the timetable for change, and the method and problems of establishing Creole as the national language.

English, the second national language

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will be the only other medium of teaching, while French, the third language, will become a compulsory subject but not a teaching medium.

**Creole academy**

Primary schools in Seychelles will start teaching Creole from next January. This is to enable those involved in the teaching to train the necessary personnel and prepare the material, followed by the design and production of dictionaries, grammar and other books and the complete revision of the present teaching programmes for P1 classes.

A Creole academy will also be set up to monitor and guide the development of the country's first language.

Following a basic instruction in Creole up to P6 level, Seychellois students will then be allowed to study English, the second language.

The committee recommended that Creole, being the mother tongue, will still be used to facilitate understanding of English. The medium of instruction for certain subjects would be determined by the Ministry of Education and Information.

Many Seychellois feel this is a welcome move because they believe that in learning English as the medium of instruction, pupils tend to become Westernised.

"This way, at least, they will now take interest in their culture, which is so rich and must be mastered," one teacher said ●

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